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Abstract
Software diversity protects against a modern-day exploits such as code-reuse attacks.
When an attacker designs a code-reuse attack on an example executable, it relies on
replicating the target environment. With software diversity, the attacker cannot reliably
replicate their target. This is a security benefit which can be applied to massive-scale
software distribution. When applied to large-scale communities, an invested attacker
may perform analysis of samples to improve the chances of a successful attack [1].
We present a general NOP-insertion algorithm which can be expanded and customized
for security, performance, or other costs. We demonstrate an improvement in security so
that a code-reuse attack based on any one variant has minimal chances of success on an-
other and analyse the costs of this method. Alternately, the variants may be customized
to meet performance or memory overhead constraints. Deterministic diversification al-
lows for the flexibility to balance these needs in a way that doesn’t exist in a random
online method.
Motivation
Software diversification for security increases the cost an attacker has to pay for a suc-
cessful attack. When a code-reuse attack is crafted on a sample of diversified software,
it no longer has a guarantee of success when applied to a diversified version of the same
program [1]. The attacker is partly uninformed about the low-level structure of future
code snippets it wants to reuse. The defender is partly uninformed about which variant
will be analysed by the attacker and which will be targeted for attack. To minimize
the expected chance of successful attack, vulnerable code should be diversified between
builds. In the absence of specific knowledge of future vulnerabilities, a general strategy
is to maximize diversity throughout the entire executable.
Producing a diverse community can be decomposed into two tasks: a method of
producing diverse variants and a method of selecting the order in which variants are dis-
tributed for use. The first task is where all the diversity takes place. Previous techniques
perform that task in an online manner during distribution. In these online systems, di-
versification is entangled with distribution. The result is random diversification with no
shared memory between compilation sessions. These complications make it difficult to
optimize diversity. A more powerful deterministic diversification process can be achieved
by separating the diversification task from compile-time. Deterministic methods provide
better diversity and efficiency. The deterministic algorithm uses any existing diversifica-
tion technique, such as NOP-insertion or function shuffling, and creates a set of output
variants which are randomly distributed later at compile-time.
We will explain how to evaluate diversity in the context of security. Then we will
introduce a deterministic diversification algorithm and a framework for comparing it
with alternate methods.
Previous work
Shacham introduced the return-oriented attack [2], a code-reuse method in which code
snippets called "gadgets" are used to perform arbitrary operations for the attacker.
These attacks take advantage of the liberal geometry of x86 assembly language: hetero-
geneous instruction length, jumps to arbitrary offsets, and dense instruction encoding
create many overlapping instruction sequences. If an arbitrary executable address is
called, it will run an instruction which may not have been present in the original pro-
gram design. Return-oriented attacks use chain together gadgets that end in a RETURN
instruction by modifying the stack. Newer techniques use alternate methods to combine
gadgets, such as a focus on gadgets ending in a JUMP instruction rather than a RE-
TURN [3]. These methods circumvent the write-or-execute W⊕X defence by executing
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only code that exists on the target system. They are also capable of arbitrary operations
when carefully crafted. Shacham showed that the common Unix libc library contained
Turing-complete sets of gadgets, and most libraries present in modern systems do as
well.
Code-reuse attacks rely on analysis of a file to catalogue functional gadgets and their
locations within the executable. Software diversity functions as a defence against these
attacks by invalidating a gadget catalogue for other executables in the population. Gad-
gets the attacker relies on may be moved, removed, or replaced with alternate functions.
Franz’ diversifying compiler (multicompiler) automates this process at compile time [1].
Evaluating Diversity
A diversification process can be thought of as a set of possible output states (variants)
as well as the frequency and order in which each variant is produced. An ideal method
will produce a community of executables with these qualities: The number of variants
should equal the size of the population. That is, each variant should be used once.
Additionally, each variant should share as few common gadgets as possible with every
other variant. Entropy estimates can show the relationship between these parameters
and the probability of successful attack.
Entropy
For a random process, an entropy estimate reflects the amount of information required to
describe the output of the process [4]. For security purposes, this is useful for estimating
the amount of information that an attacker will have to collect in order to optimally
predict the results of the process. For example, if after studying some small number of
sample executables, an attacker observes a pattern that useful gadgets tend to appear
at the front of the memory space, the attacker will know to “aim” for that area in the
future. By increasing entropy, we ensure that the attacker is left without these types of
clues or at least require the attacker to invest in gathering more samples in order to find
one.
S = −
∑
c
[P (c) ∗ logb(P (c))]
P (c) is the probability of a particular "state" occurring. A valid definition is such that
the greater the total entropy of our system, the less information an attacker is expected
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to learn by studying samples of the population.
Jackson defines a "state" as a particular output state of a program from the compiler
[5]. Under this model, P (c) is the probability of any particular output state of the
compiler. All of the options available to the compiler at compile time will determine
this probability. In a stochastic compilation setting, this can become complex and make
P (c) difficult to identify.
For the purposes of this work, each the possible output states is called a variant, and
a “state” is the case of a particular gadget existing in another variant. This definition
reflects more of the attacker’s perspective than the defender’s. It results in a simpler
analysis and preserves the purpose of the entropy measure. P (c) is the probability that
a "functionally equivalent gadget", one that has the same effect on processor state [5],
exists at the same location in another variant. It is as if an attacker has studied one
and targeted the other. If we have special knowledge of an attacker’s habits or the code
in question, the model can be modified to account for them. Otherwise, we simplify the
model by assuming a strict worst-case scenario:
• The attacker has only chosen one gadget for their attack.
• The attacker can choose any gadget present.
For a population size N , c is the state referring to a particular gadget. P (c) equals
the number of other binaries that contain that gadget from the same starting position
(or an equivalent) divided by N − 1. In real-world situations, any attack will use one
or more gadgets, so this P (c) is an upper bound on the true probability of a successful
attack.
In the absence of more specific information about what gadgets an attacker will use,
we want P (c) across all gadgets to be as uniform and small as possible. This maximizes
entropy; then the least amount of information is available to attack analyses. Our
diversification algorithms are the tools that determine P (c). In terms of the parameters
mentioned earlier, this is achieved when the diversification algorithm with variety tuned
to the size of the target population and maximum diversity between variants.
Compile-time diversification, which frequently uses iterative passes and Bernoulli tri-
als, creates many exponential processes. It cannot control which variant is produced at
compilation time. So it will always be less secure than a deterministic diversification
algorithm.
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Variants and Population Size
A population size parameter reflects how many builds are expected to be made. If a
developer creates 600 variants but uses only 300, they might have made 300 more diverse
variants or 300 at the same diversity while saving some costs along the way.
On the other hand, if 300 variants have been used, but an additional 300 binaries
need to be distributed, the developer has two choices: use each existing variant twice,
or ad hoc generate a complementary set of variants numbered 301 through 600. The
first choice maintains the performance and variety of the smaller population size. The
second choice effectively doubles the variety of the population and increases diversity,
at a theoretical cost to efficiency. In both cases, the total population isn’t distributed
uniformly. If the correct population size was known ahead of time, the variants could
have been distributed more efficiently.
Pattern-Based Approach
The general method for creating transformation patterns is
1. Identify scope of possible outputs
2. Restrict output to those that achieve desired variety, diversity, or cost
Once this is done, the patterns can be applied at will. Where a random compile-
time approach will repeat certain decisions a random number of times, a pattern-based
approach can use each pattern precisely the number of times desired.
A B
C
0 shared gadgets
90% shared gadgets
Figure 0.1: A and B alone are more diverse than A, B, and C
The strength of pre-computed patterns is the ability to selectively choose which output
states will be used. Any possible output can be filtered out, used once, multiple times, or
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saved for future use. The following algorithms focus on selectively reducing the number
of variants in order to maximize diversity.
Figure 0.2: Reducing variety to increase diversity
Function Permutation
Function permutation chooses a random permutation of the order in which functions
are written to the resulting executable at link time. The advantages of permutation
patterns are that it doesn’t use additional disk space, and is reported to have negligible
effect on performance [5]. The disadvantage is its limited variety.
j
After Function
Permutation
... ...
Before
Diversification
... ...
[5]
A compile-time function permutation might use the same permutation multiple times,
or use less-diverse variants together e.g. "2 0 3 4 5 6 1" and "2 0 3 5 6 1 6". To maximize
diversity, one or both of these variants would be excluded. While reducing the variety
allowed, diversity is improved. Maximal diversity is created by rotation of functions. The
result is F number of patterns, where F is the number of functions in the source program.
While there are F ! possible permutations, only sets of F permutations do not contain
the same function in the same position multiple times. In the best case scenario, all
functions contain disjoint sets of gadgets. Algorithm “Permutation Patterns” produces
a maximal diversity function permutation community.
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Algorithm 1 Permutation Patterns
Identify the number of functions F
Create a single permutation of function indices
Create (F-1) additional permutations by rotating
the previous permutation
Randomly permute the order of this list of permutations
Permutation patterns example for a program with 7 functions
Starting with single permutation of function indices:
2 0 3 4 5 6 1
Make complimentary patterns via rotation:
Pattern 0: 2 0 3 4 5 6 1
Pattern 1: 0 3 4 5 6 1 2
Pattern 2: 3 4 5 6 1 2 0
Pattern 3: 4 5 6 1 2 0 3
Pattern 4: 5 6 1 2 0 3 4
Pattern 5: 6 1 2 0 3 4 5
Pattern 6: 1 2 0 3 4 5 6
Then randomly permute the order of those variants so they
can be popped uniformly at compile time:
Pattern 0: 4 5 6 1 2 0 3
Pattern 1: 6 1 2 0 3 4 5
Pattern 2: 2 0 3 4 5 6 1
Pattern 3: 1 2 0 3 4 5 6
Pattern 4: 0 3 4 5 6 1 2
Pattern 5: 3 4 5 6 1 2 0
Pattern 6: 5 6 1 2 0 3 4
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NOP Insertion
Compile-time NOP insertion uses a rate parameter p to a Bernoulli trial for each instruc-
tion of the source program. If the trial is successful, a NOP is inserted in front of that
instruction [5, p56]. This method has an exponentially larger chance of affecting gad-
gets later in the file, but creates a lot of random "noise" in the middle of each. A NOP
insertion creates a shift in the instructions that follow. It has a potential diversifying
effect on every gadget that follows it.
Another defence technique is to use NOP insertions to break existing gadgets. NOPs
can be inserted between intended instructions without affecting the program semantics.
When gadgets begin in one intended instruction and continue into another, a NOP
inserted between them can remove the gadget without breaking the way the program
was intended to behave [6].
Before
Diversification
MOV [ECX], EDX ADD EBX, EAX
ADC [ECX], EAX RETGadget:
89 11 01 c3... ...
After NOP
Insertion 01 c3
ADD EBX, EAX
... ...
Gadget: Removed
MOV [ECX], EDX
89 11 90
NOP
[5]
NOP Padding
If a NOP pad of sufficient length is added to the beginning of a file, each gadget from
the original will be displaced into the gadget that follows it. This produces binaries with
disjoint gadget sets. When produced iteratively from a minimal base variant, maximum
diversity is achieved for a minimum number of NOPs inserted. Maximal diversity is
guaranteed between all previous variants by the monotonic difference between each pair
and the global constraints described below.
NOP Padding
Start with an unmodified build
For the target population size P,
Insert a single new pad in front of the previous build
Emit this as the newest build
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Figure 0.3: {A, B, C, D} are gadgets, aligned by offset. N is a NOP pad. Note: There
is no pad shown at the end of these files, but each should contain one for
obfuscation.
File 1: A B C D
File 2: N A B C D
File 3: N N A B C D
File 4: N N N A B C D
...
Figure 0.4: Noisy NOP insertion. Files 1 and 2 contain gadget C accessible from offset
3.
Offset: 0 1 2 3 4
File 1: A B N C D
File 2: N A B N C D
File 3: N N A B N C D
NOP-padding works as a low-level equivalent to address space layout randomization
or base address randomization [6, p94], except that it can also be used with low-level
operating system binaries. A few complications have to be accommodated to optimize
diversity. Real binaries have multiple gadgets that are functionally equivalent. We need
to avoid shifting one gadget into the position previously held by an equivalent gadget.
Doing so requires extensive gadget analysis that can identify all gadgets that exist with
or without NOP insertions and their functions.
A NOP already exists at offset 2 in file 1. File 2 is generated with a naive NOP
pad at the beginning. Because of the existing NOP in the middle of file 1, gadget C is
accessible in file 1 and 2 from offset 3. An additional pad, shown in file 3, pushes gadget
B into this offset, diversifying acceptably. The resulting pad length (in this case, 2) is a
minimum-size pad which will be added iteratively to each pattern.
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Function alignment is an extreme case of the noise problem. It reduces the effect of a
single base NOP pad on anything outside the first function.
Function 1 Function 2
File 1: A B C N N N D ...
File 2: N A B C N N D ...
File 3: N N A B C N D ...
File 4: N N N A B C D ...
Gadget D is in a second function, aligned by the compiler
NOP Noise
NOP instructions inserted randomly throughout the file provide their own advantages.
They can break existing gadgets [5] and make later gadgets more resilient to analysis.
If an attacker somehow identifies the global offset provided by the base pad at the
beginning of the file, they won’t know the offset of every gadget in the rest of the file.
Noise can be added to the padding algorithm above. Each noisy NOP added to a random
location creates complications for diversity as described above. The following rules
avoid those complications: Noisy NOPs present in a base pattern should be preserved in
subsequent patterns to prevent duplicate gadgets. They can be moved backward. They
can’t be moved forward or removed.
Figure 0.5: Duplicates occur at offset 3
Offset: 0 1 2 3 4
Base File: A B N C D
Removing the internal N leaves a duplicate
Alt 1: N A B C D
Migrating it forward also does
Alt 2: N A B C N D
Migrating it toward offset zero does not
Alt 3: N A N B C D
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Noise Cost
Noisy gadgets have the side-effect of decreasing the variety of resulting transformations.
Consider all variants possible with a bound of two NOPs, on a simple binary with two
gadgets A and B:
Pad-Only Pad+Noise
A B A B
N A B N A N B
N N A B
Figure 0.6: Noisy insertions reduce variety of transformations
With the noisy NOP inserted in the second set, for any given number of future NOP
insertions, the noisy set will have at least one fewer variant in it. For a high enough
noise rate, gadgets that occur later in the executable will begin to cluster toward the
end of the file. Entropy estimates for these communities will be lower than for smaller
noise rates.
Algorithm 2 NOP Patterns
For population size P and noise rate N:
Starting with an unmodified build:
Identify the minimum base pad
Identify all sets of equivalent gadgets
Create black-list of offsets for each gadget which
has downstream equivalents
Initialize an output list of patterns with the unmodified build
For (P-1) iterations:
Copy the last pattern in the output list
Increment the base pad by the minimum amount
Add noise NOPs into the pattern according to N
If a gadget G from the unmodified build is now
at a blacklisted offset:
Add an additional noise NOP before G
Add the new pattern to the output list
Randomly permute the output list
NOP padding requires a linear number of NOP insertions per build, while making
and preserving noise decreases the amount of diversity provided at the cost of memory
space. The disadvantage of these NOP methods is that they require more disk space for
the resulting file depending on the population size. The advantage is that they support
large populations, limited by available memory.
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Methods
To implement and test these diversification algorithms, we extended an existing diversify-
ing compiler to implement the “Permutation Patterns” and “NOP Padding” algorithms.
Note that in the “NOP Padding” algorithm, NOP-instructions are stored between output
variants and the number of NOPs per variant increases monotonically.
Minimal analysis was performed on the source program, and then only for the function
shuffling method which requires the number of existing functions in the program. Then
a sequence of permutation or NOP output variants was created. The order in which all
variants were to be used was decided by a random shuffle on the order in which they
were stored, and the storage then treated as a queue. When it was time for the compiler
to perform a build, a pattern was pulled from the queue and applied during link time.
We used LLVM 2.9 and Clang together with the Gold linker to apply program-wide
transformations at link time.
We experimentally identified a minimum-byte pad of 60 on a toy Hello-World program.
A base pattern is created and stored to a list. Then additional patterns are iteratively
constructed from the last pattern in the list.
For consistency with previous multicompiler tests [5, p87], we created diversified com-
munities of SQLite3.6.9. We used the same minimum-byte pad of 60 rather than au-
tomate analysis and identify an optimal pad size. We implemented noisy insertions in
NOP patterns in a very simple way: NOPs are inserted with a rate parameter as in
the compile-time method, but previous NOPs are preserved and not moved between
patterns.
Results
Diversity Comparison
For each transformation type, We created a set of 25 diversified versions of SQLite3.6.9.
The noisy pattern-based NOP-insertion used a noise rate of 5%. We also created a
"vanilla" version using Clang’s default settings. We used Jackson’s Survivor analysis
tool to identify surviving gadgets between each combination of binaries in the diversified
group [5, p128]. This uses a conservative algorithm which over-estimates the number of
surviving gadgets between executables.
The output can be formatted as a raw count of how many pairs of files contain a
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common gadget or as an aggregate number of unique gadget-location pairs that exist
among any number of files. The raw count reflects the simple chance of an uninformed
attacker finding success with a random gadget in a single attack. The aggregate count
shows a rough estimate of the spread across binaries per common gadget.
For example, the population generated with noisy NOP patterns contained 311 in-
stances where a gadget in one file survived in a second file. The aggregate count of
surviving gadgets was 301. In this case, 5 gadgets survived in 3 different files, while 296
survived across only 2.
Contrast this with the population generated through compile-time NOP insertion at a
50% rate: 621 common instances occurred, but 600 aggregate instances were made. Not
only did more common gadgets survive, but those that did so remained more spread
among the population. NOP patterns retained about 50% as many gadgets as this
non-pattern approach.
Table 0.1: Surviving Gadgets Counts
Method Number of Gadgets Found Aggregate Gadgets
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion
311 301
Pad + Noise
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion
388 382
Pad Only
Compile-time NOP05 3706 2871
Compile-time NOP25 1465 1345
Compile-time NOP50 621 600
Compile-time NOP75 732 718
Compile-time NOP100 1580 1416
In the padded NOP pattern community, 379 of the 382 unique gadgets were shared
between only 2 binaries. The remaining three were the same gadget, ’add esp, 0x1C;
ret’ in three different offsets. For each of these three offsets, the gadget was present
across three binaries. In the padded noisy pattern community, 296 of the 301 unique
gadgets were shared between only 2 binaries. There were five instances of 3-variant
gadgets. The compile-time communities had larger sets of shared gadgets: NOP-05 had
215 3-variant gadgets, NOP-25 had 61 3-variant gadgets.
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Evaluation
In both cases, the deterministic approach can achieve the same or better diversity using
the same or fewer NOP insertions than the random methods. The general counts in
Table 0.1 show this intuitively. An entropy estimate allows for direct comparison between
methods. Where N is the community size, and each gadget is spread across b builds,
the entropy is S:
S = −
∑
c
[P (c) ∗ logP (c)]
S = −
∑
c
[
bc
N
∗ log
bc
N
]
When b = 1, the gadget in question only exists at that location in one build. In this
case, P (c) represents the success probability of an attacker using a gadget location that
only exists in a single build (the one the attacker analysed.) We expect this to be zero,
because we assume the attacker doesn’t get to target the same build they analysed.
Unfortunately, log(0) is undefined and we cannot assume which build the attacker will
target. So we assume equal probability that the attacker will target each existing build
including the ones analysed: P (c) = bc
N
. By assuming this ignorant stance about the
attacker’s true target, the entropy score reflects information presented to an equally
ignorant attacker. They are a general representation and valid for attackers unaware of
which build they are targeting.
The entropy estimate also attempts to weigh the effect of having a few gadgets com-
mon to many builds with having many gadgets present in fewer builds. The entropy
calculation must reflect a comparison between many low-spread gadgets and few high-
spread gadgets. The calculations presented here use a simple assumption and are not
meant to address the trade-off between low-spread and high-spread gadgets. They are
meant to address rough differences between sets of both. The magnitudes are not as
important as how scores compare to each other.
For example, the noisy NOP pattern community has higher total entropy than the
noiseless NOP pattern community in spite of more frequent 3-build gadgets. Even if some
other weight was given to say "attackers prefer 3-build gadgets over 2-build gadgets", the
deterministic communities would still have far fewer remaining vulnerabilities than the
randomly-diversified communities. In summary, deterministic patterns are more secure.
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Table 0.2: Surviving Gadgets Spread
Method Builds per Gadget Found
Shannon Entropy
(bits)
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion 2-build gadgets: 296
15022
Pad + Noise 3-build gadgets: 5
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion 2-build gadgets: 379
15019
Pad Only 3-build gadgets: 3
Compile-time NOP05
2-build gadgets: 2592
14895
3-build gadgets: 215
...
9-build gadgets: 1
Compile-time NOP25
2-build gadgets: 1275
14976
3-build gadgets: 61
4-build gadgets: 8
6-build gadgets: 1
Compile-time NOP50
2-build gadgets: 586
150103-build gadgets: 13
4-build gadgets: 1
Compile-time NOP75
2-build gadgets: 710
150053-build gadgets: 6
4-build gadgets: 2
Compile-time NOP100
2-build gadgets: 1343
14972
3-build gadgets: 63
...
7-build gadgets: 1
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Costs
Performance
For performance tests, we used the same binaries used in the diversity comparison, in
addition to 25 more, for a total 50 diversified versions of SQLite3.6.9 for each trans-
formation type. We used a comparison benchmark Tcl script provided by the SQLite
developer [7], modified it to test only SQLite, then ran this script on each variant.
Table 0.3: Performance Overhead
Method % Synchronization
(variance)
% No Synchronization
(variance)
No transformations 0 (0) 0 (0)
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion
6.758 (4.81) 8.256 (3.90)
Pad + Noise
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion
-1.544 (1.35) -0.383 (0.894)
Pad Only
Compile-time NOP05 2.654 (1.05) 3.119 (1.1)
Compile-time NOP25 1.926 (1.38) 3.376 (1.29)
Compile-time NOP50 3.402 (1.14) 4.586 (.999)
Compile-time NOP75 6.123 (2.91) 6.771 (1.89)
Compile-time NOP100 4.463 (1.47) 6.069 (1.91)
Synchronization is an internal parameter of SQLite.
File Size
For 50 binaries of each compile-time transformation, we took the mean file size. For
each of the pattern-based transformations, the file size generated is a function of the
population size (in this case, 50). By contrast, compile-time diversification space costs
are not a function of population size. Link-time optimization with no NOPs inserted
created 615588-byte files. Clang’s default optimizations add about 8Kb of space to the
vanilla file, for 623780 bytes.
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Table 0.4: File Size Overhead
Method File Size (bytes) % Overhead
No transformations 623780 0
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion
694340 +11.31
Pad + Noise
Pattern-based NOP-Insertion
619684 -.0657
Pad Only
Compile-time NOP05 625146 +0.210
Compile-time NOP25 667930 +7.078
Compile-time NOP50 719058 +15.27
Compile-time NOP75 771316 +23.65
Compile-time NOP100 824484 +32.18
Conclusions
NOP patterns displayed more diversity per byte applied during compilation. The 50%
community had 600 gadgets and an entropy score of 15010, about 4% performance cost
and 15% additional disk space. In contrast, padding-only NOP patterns had 385 gadgets,
entropy score 15019, 2% performance improvement, and slightly less disk space than the
undiversified build. The community of NOP patterns with noise showed much higher
performance overhead, 11%, but had fewer gadgets remaining than either of the previous
two.
This implementation used regular x86 NOPs, which had a negative impact on per-
formance. Alternate NOP instructions should mitigate most of this performance over-
head [5]. Thus, for the community of programs generated by the tested compile-time
method, a more diverse community can be created for almost no cost by using a pattern-
based method.
Resulting diversity or variety can be reduced to support larger populations or smaller
cost requirements. It is tunable in the same ways compile-time methods are. For these
tests, maximal diversity was attempted without analysis of the program code. The
minimum-pad size and noise rate used in noisy NOP patterns were unoptimized. A
smaller pad or noise rate might have achieved the same effect at a smaller cost. NOP-
padding complications that would remove the remaining gadgets were ignored.
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Future Work
Testing on NOP patterns with very high noise rates could illustrate theoretical diversity costs
of noisy internal NOP insertions. Gadgets may cluster toward the end of files in these
communities.
NOP patterns might benefit from a combination with other transformations. For
a given cost budget and diversity target, NOP patterns support a certain population
size, N . If permutation patterns on its own supports a population of 2 for the same
parameters, then the combination of NOP patterns and permutation patterns could
maintain the original requirements for a population of size 2 ∗N .
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